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“Let the Red Terror intensify”:
Political violence, governance and society in urban Ethiopia, 
1976-78
Jacob Wiebel
(University of Durham)
SUMMARY: From 1976 to 1978, urban Ethiopia was in the grip of rival campaigns 
of revolutionary violence. The period is now memorialised as one of unmitigated state 
terror. It is argued in this article that this conceptualisation fails to appreciate the 
multiple layers of agency and the significant changes to the mode of violence that oc-
curred over these years. State terror in revolutionary Ethiopia was the outcome of a 
process, not a constant state of affairs. To better understand the Ethiopian Terror in 
its  political  and  social  dimensions,  the  joint  production  of  violence  by  local  and 
supra-local actors needs to be disaggregated and the evolution of the state’s repres-
sion needs to be understood. This repression went through successive stages of decen-
tralisation and bureaucratisation.  It is only when these stages are examined that the 
transformative impact of the Terror on Ethiopian society and state-society relations 
can be properly assessed.
The overthrow of Emperor Haile Selassie in 1974 left Ethiopia with a power vacuum 
to be filled and a revolution to be defined. When a council of low-ranking military officers, 
known as the Derg, took charge of the revolutionary process, its legitimacy was vehemently 
disputed by leftist civilian organisations, which drew their strength and political perspectives 
from the formidable Ethiopian student movement. By late 1976, a double helix of conflicts 
was rapidly engulfing urban Ethiopia -  one strand the confrontation between the military 
regime and its civilian opponents, the other the contest among the civilian left itself. In the 
following two years, thousands of Ethiopians, most of them young and many of them educat-
ed, lost their lives to competing campaigns of revolutionary terror. This violence was carried 
out in the name of the opposition Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party (EPRP) or, more 
commonly, of the military regime and those political organisations, led by the All Ethiopia 
Socialist Movement (Meison), that had allied themselves with the government. The Terror 
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transformed not only the political but also the social and cultural landscapes of Ethiopia. No 
realm of urban life remained untouched by the period’s violence.   1
The Ethiopian Terror years have been written about and memorialised as a period of 
sustained state terror.  The EPRDF’s “Red Terror trials”, which ran for the better part of two 2
decades following the overthrow of the Derg,  limited themselves to the prosecution of vio3 -
lence carried out in the name of the state and assumed considerable centralised control in 
their verdicts on senior government figures.  Similarly, the “Ethiopian Red Terror Martyrs’ 4
Memorial Museum”, which opened in Addis Ababa’s Meskel Square in 2010, conveys a sim-
ple narrative of state perpetrators and civilian victims, with no regard to shifts in agency and 
mode of violence. Such conceptualisations are problematic, obscuring as much as they reveal. 
For not only do they marginalise or disregard the competing campaigns of revolutionary vio-
lence that defined the Terror, most notably the EPRP’s sustained assassination campaign;  5
they also ignore the complex nature of the state’s own violence, which underwent consequen-
tial changes as the agency of local actors and the control of the military regime shifted over 
time. State terror in revolutionary Ethiopia was the outcome of a process, not a constant state 
of affairs, and it showed itself in varying guises. The dynamics of violence that defined this 
 The research on which this article is based was funded by an award from the AHRC. 1
Estifanos Terefe provided valuable assistance in evaluating and translating source mater-
ial.
 The most accentuated examples of this general tendency are Babile Tola, To kill a 2
generation (Washington, DC: Free Ethiopia Press, 1989) and Michael Chege, “The Revo-
lution Betrayed: Ethiopia, 1974-9”, Journal of Modern African Studies, 17, 3 (1979), 359-
380.
 Yacob Haile Mariam, “The Quest for Justice and Reconciliation: The International 3
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the Ethiopian High Court”, Hastings International and 
Comparative Law Review, 22, 3 (1999), 668-699; Firew Kebede Tiba, “The Mengistu 
Genocide Trial in Ethiopia”, Journal of International Criminal Justice, 5, 2 (2007), 
513-528; Kjietil Tronvoll, Charles Schaefer and Girmachew Alemu Aneme, eds., The 
Ethiopian Red Terror Trials: Transitional Justice Challenged (Oxford: James Currey, 
2009).
 See Special Prosecutor’s Office, ክፍል ሁለት፡ የፌዴራል ከፍተኛ ፍ/ቤት የሰጠው ውሣኔ 4
[“Part Two: The verdict given by the Federal High Court”] (Addis Ababa, 2006).
 The subject has recently been brought to public attention by the much-publicised 5
publication of Hiwot Teferra, Tower in the Sky (Addis Ababa: Addis Ababa University 
Press, 2012).
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process and the legacies that it bequeathed to state-society relations in Ethiopia for subse-
quent decades are the subject of this article. 
Following an initial phase dominated by paralysing power struggles within the Derg, 
the development of revolutionary state terror in Ethiopia went through two interrelated but 
distinct stages. The first, beginning in February 1977, was a period of decentralisation, in 
which the regime’s adoption of new strategies of revolutionary violence - the arming of citi-
zens, the institution of comprehensive search campaigns and the convocation of so-called 
“mass-confession sessions” - decentralised the state’s means of violence, leading to a plethora 
of localised reigns of terror. As a result of this process, the Ethiopian Terror was never merely 
a conflict between competing political groups. Its violence was as much bottom-up as it was 
top-down, produced by supra-local and local actors in synergistic but often distinguishable 
ways, reflective of local agendas as well as of the Terror’s political master cleavage. The sec-
ond stage,  which began to  emerge in  July 1977,  witnessed a  re-assertion of  the military 
regime’s claims on the exercise of revolutionary violence, leading to an institutionalisation 
and bureaucratisation of violent practices that would define and indeed outlast the Derg’s 
rule.  This  process  of  bureaucratisation,  whereby  collective  violence  was  normalised  and 
brought under state control, has scarcely received any attention in the historiography of the 
Ethiopian revolution. 
This article addresses these historiographical gaps by disaggregating the categories of 
state terror and political violence, describing the multiple layers of agency and the significant 
changes to the mode of violence that shaped the Ethiopian Terror. Following a brief introduc-
tion to the social and political context within which revolutionary collective violence erupted 
in urban Ethiopia, the two defining moments or stages of the Derg’s terror are examined: the 
process whereby the state’s means of violence were decentralised, and subsequent efforts to 
establish government control over the exercise of “revolutionary measures”, entailing a bu-
reaucratisation of violent practices. The conclusion considers the broader implications of this 
history for our understanding of the Ethiopian Terror’s place in the historiography, especially 
in relation to the Terror’s role in defining the social order of Ethiopia under the Derg.  It 
shows how the history of the Terror continues to affect state-society relations to this day.
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The Ethiopian Terror: Background and Context
Among the most immediate transformations to attend the 1974 revolution were its 
effects on political space and practice. New political organisations, unions and associations 
surfaced and mobilised support, as the country experienced unprecedented degrees of politi-
cal  interest  and  participation,  particularly  among  the  younger  generation.  Across  urban 
Ethiopia, the meaning and matrix of youth was being redefined by the revolutionary situation. 
Political concerns and identity markers subsumed other domains of life, and for many politi-
cal activism became both a full-time occupation and an initiation into adulthood. Like others 
in his generation, Aklilu Kebede decided to devote himself to revolutionary struggle as a 
teenager. At seventeen years old, he had become the chairman of the Youth Association of his 
local Urban Dweller Association (Kebele) in the vicinity of Arat Kilo in Addis Ababa. His 
daily life consisted of activities few Ethiopian teenagers would have understood or recog-
nised a decade earlier, but which were now in keeping with the social norms and expectations 
of his peers:
“We tried to approach youths, to bring them to a study group, discuss 
Marxism-Leninism,  discuss  the  importance  of  organisation,  discuss 
the need to be involved because they are the youths, this era belongs to 
them. They were the generation. This requires their involvement. […] 
We tried to organise the women’s association, the workers’ associa-
tion, we distributed pamphlets. We did some practical work to tell the 
people of Ethiopia that the EPRP is here to lead them to victory. All 
these  things:  organising,  recruiting,  and  day  to  day  organisational 
work. That is how most of the time was spent.”6
Political activism among the capital’s young, which had first occurred through a Uni-
versity group know as ‘the Crocodile Society’ in the early 1960s  and increasingly gained 7
currency within the student movement in the subsequent generation, came to be common-
place  in  the  early  years  of  the  revolution.  Marxism became the  new orthodoxy as  High 
School  and University  students  joined the newly emerged political  organisations in  large 
 Aklilu Kebede, interviewed in Silver Springs, MD, 20 August 2012.6
 Randi R. Balsvik, Haile Selassie’s Students:The Intellectual and Social Background 7
to Revolution, 1952-1974 (East Lansing: African Studies Centre, Michigan State Univer-
sity, 1985), 118.
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numbers, politicising their private and social lives. Aklilu Kebede speaks for many when he 
recalls the close association he made between youth - belonging to “the generation” - and po-
litical activism: “this is my responsibility as a youth, I have to take part in this revolution.” 
The discontinuity with the largely apolitical activities and aspirations of earlier generations of 
youths in the capital is evident. 
While reverberating across societal divides, the new political activism was largely the 
product of the urban middle classes that had matured in the final decades of imperial rule. 
Emperor Haile Selassie I, seeking to check the power of the traditional nobility and needing 
to staff the developing bureaucracy of the Ethiopian state, had actively encouraged the forma-
tion of these new meritocratic middle classes, free from regional interests and supposedly 
loyal to the central court.  The urban middle classes were defined by western education and 8
distinguished by the performance and consumption of a westernised lifestyle.  In one of the 9
most critical studies of the Ethiopian student movement, Messay Kebede has argued that the 
encounter  with  western  education  led  to  an  experience  of  “cultural  dislocation”  for  the 
Ethiopians involved.  Such dislocation proved fertile ground, however, for the new elite’s 10
cosmopolitan linkages produced fruits of cultural hybridity that made late imperial  Addis 
Ababa “the very essence of modernist audacity.”  Jazz music and the visual arts flourished, 11
modernistic buildings were erected and intellectual discourses about progress and liberty - in 
some quarters increasingly identified with Marxist thought - proliferated. Embracing a new 
set of Ethiopian identities, at once urban and cosmopolitan, the urban middle classes pro-
duced many of the primary agents in the downfall of the imperial regime that they had been 
designed to bolster. The membership of both the radical Ethiopian student movement and of 
the political organisations that emerged from its midst was largely drawn from these urban 
middle classes.
 Donald Levine, Wax and Gold: Tradition and Innovation in Ethiopian Culture (Chica8 -
go: University of Chicago Press, 1965), 183-4.
 Marco di Nunzio, “The Arada Have Been Eaten: Living Through Marginality in Addis 9
Ababa's Inner City” (D.Phil. Thesis, University of Oxford, 2012), chapter 3.
 Messay Kebede, Radicalism and Cultural Dislocation in Ethiopia, 1960-1974 10
(Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2008).
 Francis Falceto, “Introduction” to The Very Best of the Ethiopiques (Audio CD, Buda 11
Musique, 2005)
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The two most significant civilian political organisations of the early revolutionary era, 
the All Ethiopia Socialist Movement (Meison) and the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Par-
ty (EPRP), had been founded by members of the student movement before the revolution 
erupted.  Neither organisation played a consequential role in the uprisings of 1974, but both 12
used the political space these afforded to establish themselves in urban Ethiopia and to mo-
bilise support. Initially, the organisations were united in their opposition to military rule and 
their demands for a “provisional people’s government”.  When Meison’s international lead13 -
ership returned to Ethiopia in early 1975, however, the organisation suspended its opposition, 
offering the Derg an alliance that would redefine the political map of revolutionary Ethiopia.
The early Derg was shaped by its attempts to address the dual challenge confronting 
it: how to institutionalise military rule while negotiating internal factions and conflicts. Vio-
lent responses to these challenges were a constant feature of Derg rule, brutally evidenced in 
the massacre of high officials of the ancien régime and of Aman Andom, the first revolution-
ary head of state, in November 1974.  But alongside the recourse to violence, alternative re14 -
sponses developed. Following the propagation of the tame nationalist slogan Ityopia Tikdem 
[“Ethiopia First”], the military regime began to institute truly revolutionary policies. Its ze-
mecha [“campaign”] for “development through cooperation”, in which 60.000 University and 
High School students were sent across the country to spread literacy and to educate peasants 
 See the detailed accounts of the organisations’ foundations in Andargachew As12 -
segid, በአጭር የተቀጨ ረጅም ጉዞ: መኢሶን በኢትዮጵያ ሕዝቦች ትግል ውስት [“A Long Journey 
Cut Short: Meison in the struggle of the Ethiopian people”] (Addis Ababa: The Central 
Printing Press, 2000) and Kiflu Tadesse, The Generation: the History of the Ethiopian 
People’s Revolutionary Party (Lanham: University Press of America, 1993).
 E.g. “ደሞክራሲያዊ ረፑብሊክ ወይስ የወታድር መንግስት” [“Democratic Republic or Military 13
Rule”], የሳፊው ሕዝብ ድምፅ [‘Voice of the Broad Masses’ - Meison’s organ], 5 (10 Sep-
tember 1974); “ለውጥ ለሕዝብ ብሕዝብ” [“Change for the people by the people”], 
ደሞክራሲያ [‘Democracy’ - EPRP’s organ], 3 (1 August 1974).
 Asfa Wossen Asserate, Ein Prinz aus dem Hause David (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 14
2007), chapter 1; Bahru Zewde, “The History of the Red Terror”, in Tronvol et al., The 
Ethiopian Red Terror Trials, 23; Andargachew Tiruneh, The Ethiopian Revolution, 
1974-1987: a Transformation from an Aristocratic to a Totalitarian Autocracy (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 77.
 6
from December 1974,  was followed by nationalisation programmes and, most significantly, 15
by comprehensive Land Reform in February 1975.  The Land Reform subverted entrenched 16
relations of property and power and proved hugely popular.  17
Revolutionary Land Reform also triggered Meison’s offer of “critical support”, which 
strengthened the Derg’s legitimacy in the urban areas, provided it with a coherent ideological 
discourse and introduced efficient methods of political organisation and mobilisation. Mei-
son, in turn, gained considerable influence and a number of ministerial posts. In control of the 
Provisional Office of Mass Organisational Affairs (POMOA) and with access to state media 
and resources, Meison was able to build a vigorous grassroots support network.  Tensions 18
with the numerically stronger EPRP, which accused Meison of selling the revolution for ac-
cess to state power, rapidly escalated and militarised.19
In April 1976, following the EPRP’s rejection of the regime’s “Programme of the Na-
tional Democratic Revolution”, which represented a last attempt to co-opt opposition as much 
as a roadmap for revolutionary Ethiopia’s development,  violent confrontation appeared in20 -
evitable.  The EPRP prepared itself by establishing “urban defense squads”, a militia force 21
 Bahru Zewde, A History of Modern Ethiopia, 1855-1991 (Oxford: James Currey, 15
2001), 240; Donald Donham, Marxist Modern: An Ethnographic History of the Ethiopian 
Revolution (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), chapter 2; Dawit Wolde Gior-
gis, Red Tears: War, Famine and Revolution in Ethiopia (Trenton: Red Sea Press, 1989), 
26
 Abera Yemane Ab, “The Defeat of the Ethiopian Revolution and the Role of the So16 -
viet Union”, Proceedings of the Second International Conference on the Horn of Africa 
(1987), 91-2.
 Andargachew Tiruneh, The Ethiopian Revolution, 101.17
 Andargachew Tiruneh, The Ethiopian Revolution, 162.18
 Smaller political organisations, such as the Red Flag, Wez League, Ichaat and Ma19 -
lerid, joined either the EPRP in opposition to the Derg or Meison in governing alliance 
with the military regime.
 POMOA, Basic Documents of the Ethiopian Revolution (Addis Ababa: Ethiopia In20 -
formation Center, 1977); Andargachew Tiruneh, The Ethiopian Revolution, 162.
 David and Marina Ottaway, Ethiopia: Empire in Revolution (New York: Africana 21
Publishing Company, 1978), 113.
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briefed to obtain arms and funds as well as to defend EPRP members and property.  By Sep22 -
tember 1976, violent confrontation engulfed Addis Ababa. The Derg began a campaign to 
repress the “anarchist” EPRP,  consisting of denunciations, detentions and sporadic execu23 -
tions of suspected regime opponents.  In contrast to the matured Terror of 1977, the Derg’s 24
early repression was still accompanied by lengthy explanations and justifications of its vio-
lence. The EPRP concomitantly launched its strategy of “offensive defense”, a campaign of 
targeted assassinations aimed at government figures and supporters. The strategy was highly 
controversial within the party, resulting in a violent and consequential split. By March 1977, 
the campaign had claimed the lives of at least fifty high-profile government supporters  and 25
instilled perceptions of an atrocity environment in regime figures, fanning the development of 
state terror.
The conflict was played out as much at the level of high politics as in the everyday 
interactions of urban communities on the ground. “At the time you couldn’t escape it,” the 
filmmaker Ermias Wolde Amlak recalls; “[when] you go to school, you find it; when you go 
to your neighbourhood to play football, you find it.”  The Terror was beginning to dominate 26
urban life. Kebele associations in particular became fiercely contested sites of mobilisation 
and confrontation. The momentum during these months lay firmly with the EPRP’s assassina-
tion campaign. The regime’s response was paralysed by its internal power struggles, which 
saw a moderate wing formed around Alemayehu Hailu,  Moges Wolde Mikael  and Tafari 
Bante marginalise the radical faction of Mengistu Haile Mariam and POMOA in December 
 Kiflu Tadesse, The Generation, Part II: Ethiopia: Transformation and Conflict. The 22
History of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party (Lanham: University Press of Amer-
ica, 1998), 125.
 The denunciation of “anarchists” made the front page of the government dailies 23
through September, beginning with the article: “PMAC Issues Warning: Subversive Activ-
ities of Anarchists Exposed”, 13 September 1976, Ethiopian Herald.
 E.g. “For Murder, Counter-Revolutionary Crimes: Twenty-Three Anarchists Execut24 -
ed”, 3 November 1976, Ethiopian Herald;  “PMAC Announces Execution of 27 for Acts In-
imical to Revolution”, 19 November 1976, Ethiopian Herald.
 Afr. 25/01/77, March 1977, Amnesty International.25
 Ermias Wolde Amlak, interviewed at the Goethe Institut, Addis Ababa, 7 March 26
2012.
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1976 and January 1977.  This changed drastically when Mengistu Haile Mariam took con27 -
trol of the Derg. 
The Decentralisation of Collective Violence
On 3 February 1977, Mengistu Haile Mariam had his prominent opponents within the 
Derg shot during a meeting of its Standing Committee, accusing them of plotting a “counter-
revolutionary coup d’état”.  Their deaths spelt the end of the Derg’s era of contradictions 28
and accommodations; opposing views could no longer be aired within the military regime.  29
Under Mengistu’s chairmanship a more radical Derg emerged, unwilling to tolerate dissent 
and prepared to violently “pluck out”  and “liquidate”  its opponents. The events of 3 Feb30 31 -
ruary marked a decisive turning point in the Ethiopian Terror.32
At a mass rally in Addis Ababa’s Revolution Square on the following day, Mengistu 
produced a dramatic violence-legitimising performance, smashing bottles filled with red flu-
 Andargachew Tiruneh, The Ethiopian Revolution, 188-9.27
 “Counter-Revolutionary Coup Foiled: Revolutionary Measures Taken Against Ring28 -
leaders”, 4 February 1977, Ethiopian Herald.
 Abera Yemane Ab, The Defeat, 94; see also Haggai Erlich, “The Establishment of 29
the Derg: The Turning of a Protest Movement into a Revolution” in Robert Hess, ed., Pro-
ceedings of the Fifth International Conference of Ethiopian Studies (Chicago: Office of 
Publications Services, University of Illinois at Chicago Circle, 1979), 796.
 Gebru Tareke, “The History of the Ethiopian Revolution and the Red Terror” in 30
Ethiopian Red Terror Documantation and Research Centre [hereafter ERTDRC], Docu-
menting the Red Terror: Bearing Witness to Ethiopia’s Lost Generation (Ottawa: ERT-
DRC, 2012), 49.
 The infelicitous term was a favourite of the Ethiopian Herald, the government’s 31
English-language daily, and made almost daily front-page news. See for example “EPRP 
Leader Here Liquidated”, 25 March 1977, Ethiopian Herald; “Counter-Revolutionary Ban-
dits Liquidated’, 26 March 1977, Ethiopian Herald; “AETU Calls on Workers to Wipe Out 
Assassins, Counter-Revolutionaries”, 27 March 1997, Ethiopian Herald.
 Bahru Zewde, The History of the Red Terror, 27; Kiflu Tadesse, The Generation 32
Part II, 188; Gebru Tareke, The History of the Ethiopian Revolution, 47.
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ids  while declaring that henceforth “we will avenge the blood of our comrades double- and 33
triple-fold.” The revolution, he announced, “has advanced from the defensive to the offensive 
position”.  The crowd, whether cowed or mesmerised, responded in kind, chanting that “ter34 -
ror has passed from the revolutionary camp to the anti-revolutionary camp.”  The image of 35
the Head of State spilling blood in front of 200.000 demonstrators has become one of the en-
during icons of the Derg’s violence. Mengistu’s speech, however, ushered in the most decen-
tralised and least state-controlled phase of the Ethiopian Terror, not the commonly assumed 
uniform state violence. 
The decentralisation of the state’s means of violence in early 1977 grew out of new 
anti-insurgency practices instituted by the radical Derg. In March, the regime began to arm 
perceived supporters, organised into local Abyot Tebeka [“Revolution Defense”] squads. The 
arming of civilians was never completed - only 120 of Addis Ababa’s 297 Kebele Associa-
tions had been armed by July 1977  - but those Kebeles in which guns were distributed now 36
possessed militias of about 20 armed men,  mandated to use violence in order to “demolish 37
forces opposed to the revolution and the preservation of national unity”.  As in other con38 -
flicts, such incorporation of civilians into the counterinsurgency response, armed and relative-
ly unbound by institutional controls, entailed a devolution and localisation of state violence.  39
 Bahru Zewde, The History of the Red Terror, 27.33
 “PMAC Pledges Democratic Rights to Masses: Mammoth Rally Here Denounces En34 -
emies of Unity, Revolution”, 5 February 1977, Ethiopian Herald.
 Bahru Zewde, The History of the Red Terror, 27.35
 Abera Yemane Ab, The Defeat, 95.36
 Lefort, An Heretical Revolution, 241-2.37
 “Gov’t Arms Six Hundred Workers, Kebele Representatives Here”, 6 March 1977, 38
Ethiopian Herald; cf. Andargachew Tiruneh, The Ethiopian Revolution, 208-9.
 See for example Daniel Branch, Defeating Mau Mau, Creating Kenya: Counterin39 -
surgency, Civil War and Decolonization (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 
216-7.
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The radical Derg’s first strategy against urban insurgents consisted in the arming of its 
supporters; the second concentrated on the disarming of its opponents. On 23 March, the 
Derg launched its  first  comprehensive Asesa  [“search campaign”] in the capital.  For four 
days, all roads were blocked to unauthorised traffic, as search teams consisting mainly of lo-
cal Abyot Tebeka squads combed neighbourhoods for hidden opposition activists, weapons 
and propaganda material. The search claimed the lives of several prominent EPRP leaders,  40
but it failed to dismantle the party’s organisational structure in the way an earlier search in 
Dase town had done.  Instrumentalising local denunciations and giving Kebele actors license 41
to carry out “revolutionary measures” with minimal supervision, the Asesa - which became a 
regular institution in revolutionary Ethiopia - markedly furthered the decentralisation of the 
state’s means of violence. 
A third  counterinsurgency  strategy  adapted  in  March  1977  consisted  of  so-called 
“mass-confession” or “public-exposure” sessions. These were gatherings at which employees 
and citizens were cajoled or threatened, by means of elaborate and lengthy performances, into 
denouncing colleagues and neighbours or into confessing their  own counter-revolutionary 
activities. This public inquisition into urban Ethiopians’ revolutionary - or perhaps rather loy-
alist - credentials was conducted at “government ministries, public utilities and all major or-
ganisations, [which were] required to ‘cleanse’ themselves by the exposure of ‘reactionaries’ 
within their midst.”  They became such a prominent feature of Ethiopian public life that for 42
the subsequent year it appeared as though “the whole country was gripped in a process of 
‘mass confession’ and ‘self-denunciation’.”  Based on a logic of denunciation and a pre43 -
sumption of guilt, such sessions augmented the state’s devolution of control over the exercise 
of its violence to local actors.
 Bahru Zewde, The History of the Red Terror, 27-8.40
 Abdu Muhammad, “A History of Dase Town, 1941-1991” (MA Thesis in History, Ad41 -
dis Ababa University, 1997), 84.
 Addis Ababa Embassy Cable to EAD and FCO, 25 April 1978, FCO 31/2257-29, 42
United Kingdom National Archives [hereafter UKNA]. The file contains a detailed descrip-
tion of such a session held at the National Theatre for the entire Ministry of Agriculture.
 Kiflu Tadesse, The Generation Part II, 192-3.43
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The introduction of these counterinsurgency strategies by the Derg  and its civilian 
allies marginalised the courts and redefined notions of citizenship.  As Mengistu Haile Mari44 -
am himself declared in February 1977, “only those who are opposed to imperialism, feudal-
ism and bureaucratic capitalism and who are genuine revolutionaries and patriots will have a 
place in socialist Ethiopia”.  Revolutionary violence was legitimised by a prior depersonali45 -
sation of its victims. 
While revolutionary Ethiopia’s politics of exclusion was minted at the political centre, 
it was necessarily implemented by local actors on the ground. Here, it was readily localised 
into alternative conflicts or instrumentalised for personal agendas. The modes and extent of 
violence varied widely across urban Ethiopia, depending on the use local actors made of the 
violence-legitimatising revolutionary situation; widely, however, it tended towards the rise of 
“over-enthusiastic tyrants”.  With the impunity provided by the demise of the courts to those 46
deemed “genuine revolutionaries and patriots”, highly local regimes of terror began to form. 
Among the most infamous was that established by Girma Kebede.
In the historiography of the Ethiopian Revolution, the figure of Girma Kebede has 
become the epitome of the brutal local despot. The obituaries of his last group of victims, 
published after he had been removed from his Kebele position, consistently referred to him as 
Aremenew - “the cruel one”.  His violence made him the prime example of the armed and 47
centrally empowered Kebele  leaders who “transformed themselves into ‘petty chiefs’ who 
looked on their neighbourhood as a fief.”  48
 P. Brietzke, Law, Development, and the Ethiopian Revolution (Lewisburg: Bucknell 44
University Press, 1982), 186-99.
 “Chairman Addresses Graduates of 30th Batch of Guennet Military School”, 13 Feb45 -
ruary 1977, Ethiopian Herald.
 Embassy Cable to EAD and FCO, 27 April 1978, FCO 31/2257-32, UKNA.46
 የሰማንያ ቀን መታሰቢያ [“Memorial of the eighth day”], April 1977, ERTDRC 0015490, 47
ERTDRC archive.
 Lefort, An Heretical Revolution, 241-2.48
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Girma Kebede was “a frustrated, short guy with huge complexes”,  who had been 49
routinely bullied as a student at Tafari Mekonnen school.  Following the 1974 revolution, he 50
became an enthusiastic supporter of the military regime, thriving on the identity and status 
that the new political order afforded him. Highly involved in the affairs of his Kebele in Ad-
dis Ababa’s Arat Kilo neighbourhood, he was elected to office and put in charge of its Abyot 
Tebeka squad in early 1977. In this position, he stretched the power and implicit impunity 
extended to him, establishing one of revolutionary Ethiopia’s most infamous local reigns of 
terror. Among his victims were not only regime opponents, but also personal foes like his old 
chemistry teacher, Mesfin Woldeab. Neither did Girma limit his operations to his own admin-
istrative area: where he suspected neighbouring Kebeles of apathy, he led his Abyot Tebeka 
squads to ensure that “revolutionary justice” was carried out. In these activities, Girma was 
encouraged by the Derg’s Legesse Asfaw - one of Mengistu’s closest confidants  and in 51
Dawit Wolde Giorgis’ view “the most dangerous man the revolution has brought to power”  52
- who issued him with a Kalashnikov “for his personal protection”.  53
The operational context within which Kebele actors like Girma Kebede acted indi-
cates that, contrary to subsequent Derg propaganda, localised reigns of violence in revolu-
tionary Ethiopia need to be understood less as the products of proverbial “bad apples” and 
more as the aggregate result of local agency operating within organisational structures that 
legitimised and mandated violence. Based on a national security discourse and the deperson-
alisation of dissidents, the exercise of violence was justified and devolved to local actors.  54
 Yeraswork Admassie, interviewed at Addis Ababa University, 26 September 2011.49
 Kiflu Tadesse, interviewed by phone, 6 January 2012.50
 D. Day (British Embassy Addis Ababa) to A.G. Munro (EAD), 14 March 1978, FC0 51
31/2257-20, UKNA.
 Dawit Wolde Giorgis, Red Tears, 62.52
 Abera Yemane Ab, The Defeat, 93.53
 Compare the conclusions in Martha K. Huggins, Mika Haritos-Fatouros and Philip G. 54
Zimbardo, Violence Workers: Police Torturers and Murderers Reconstruct Brazilian Atroc-
ities (Berkeley: University of Califiornia Press, 2002); and in David M. Anderson, “British 
Abuse and Torture in Kenya’s Counter-Insurgency, 1952-1960”, Small Wars and Insur-
gencies, 23, 4-5 (2012), 700-719.
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Girma Kebede soon outlived his  usefulness  and became an embarrassment  to  the 
regime. On 26 March 1977, Girma and his Abyot Tebeka squad brutally murdered nine em-
ployees of the Berhanena Selam Printing Press in public. Among the victims was heavily 
pregnant Daro Negash, a mother of eight who was also an outspoken trade union activist and 
clandestinely  active  in  the  EPRP’s  Ethiopian  Women’s  Coordinating  Committee.  The 55
killings caused a public uproar.  Soon afterwards, Girma mistakenly arrested Mengistu Haile 56
Mariam’s uncle, Asrat Wolde, during a “mass-confession” session held for the Ministry of 
Education. Considered a liability, Girma Kebede was publicly executed on 2 April 1977.  57
The decentralised exercise of violence that had characterised Girma’s terror, however, inten-
sified further across urban Ethiopia. 
On the eve of May Day 1977, Addis Ababa witnessed the most violent day in the his-
tory of the Ethiopian Terror. Hundreds of youths were killed that night  in “the largest mass 58
execution of the revolution”.  The massacres occurred after local demonstrations were met 59
with the aggregate force of Kebele and military officials, prepared for the city-wide protests 
through information obtained in torture chambers. Following initial shootings, thousands of 
demonstrators  were  detained and executions  continued throughout  the  night.  In  the  mas-
sacres’ aftermath, grieving parents were infamously charged by Kebele guards for the bullets 
that slew their children. 
 Kiflu Tadesse, The Generation Part II, 23.55
 Halliday and Molyneux, The Ethiopian Revolution, 123; Ottaways, Ethiopia: Empire 56
in Revolution, 146.
 “Six Persons Executed for Dastardly, Inhuman Murder of 24 Persons”, 3 April 1977, 57
Ethiopian Herald.
 Precise numbers are impossible to ascertain, especially since many youths were 58
driven outside the city for execution. According to Lefort, An heretical revolution, 201, 
the official death toll was 732, indicating a significantly higher figure. Rinehart estimates 
that 2000 youths were killed that night: Robert Rinehart, “National Security” in Harold D. 
Nelson and Irving Kaplan, eds., Ethiopia: A Country Study (Washington, D.C.: DA Pam, 
1981).
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The Derg  rejected responsibility  for  the May Day massacres,  instead blaming the 
demonstrating  youths  as  well  as  Meison,  thus  heightening  tensions  with  its  ally.  But  its 
protestations were belied by the immediate unfolding, under its auspices, of the climax of de-
centralised Terror in urban Ethiopia: the netsa ermeja [“free measure”]. During this period, 
the Derg  ceased to formally announce, explain or justify most of the “revolutionary mea-
sures” carried out in its name; the normalisation of revolutionary violence was complete. 
Like other revolutionary reigns of terror, the netsa ermeja was defined by summary justice, 
personified in soldiers or, more commonly, local Kebele officials, who “arrested the suspect, 
being judge, counsel, witness and executioner and all at one time.”  60
A significant but routinely ignored dimension of the netsa ermeja’s violent chaos was 
the widespread occurrence of sexual assault.  Particularly in the makeshift Kebele  prisons, 
sexual violence was a common feature of detention.  Thousands of women were raped dur61 -
ing this period, and threats to rape wives, daughters or other family members are reported to 
have  been  regularly  employed  in  order  to  coerce  collaboration  or  to  break  resistant 
detainees.  62
In stark contrast to the marked silence about sexual violence in the Terror’s memorial-
isation, the public display of dead bodies that became a defining feature of Ethiopia’s revolu-
tionary violence during the netsa ermeja has been cast as a negative icon of the period. The 
practice left a deep impression on residents and visitors alike; the communicative dimension 
of violence was never clearer. The bodies of alleged “counter-revolutionaries” were left on 
the streets for days, mutilated at night by hyenas descending from the forests on the city’s 
edge. Relatives were forbidden to retrieve the bodies of loved ones and - in a further, post-
humous depersonalisation of the victim - even prohibited to mourn them in culturally appro-
priate  ways.  These  practices  were  to  outlast  the  netsa  ermeja,  continuing  to  define  the 
 Rosemary O’Kane, The Revolutionary Reign of Terror: The Role of Violence in Polit60 -
ical Change (Brookfield: E. Elgar, 1991), 22.
 Se Felekech Metaferia Woldehana: Sparkle: The Protégée of Emperor Haile Se61 -
lassie: Memories of My Ethiopian Girlhood (Victoria, B.C.: Trafford, 2002), 246; Yibkaw 
Wolde Tsadik, interviewed at Radisson Blu Hotel, Addis Ababa, 10 March 2012.
 Gebru Tareke, The History of the Ethiopian Revolution, 51.62
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Ethiopian Terror as it moved into a new phase of greater government control over the exer-
cise of violence. 
The decentralised violence that characterised the urban Terror for much of 1977 tore 
the social fabric apart, eroding trust and dividing communities. Suspicion and a widespread 
retreat from the public square ensued. But the logic of the Terror did not allow for an un-
touched private realm. With the onset of the Terror, private homes were subjected to raids and 
searches. Such raids often came in clusters and typically at night, violating the privacy and 
security of the home while asserting the unrestricted claims and reach of the state. Membere 
Tsion, a young resident of Addis Ababa during the Terror, recalls a Kebele search squad raid-
ing her  house five times in a  single night,  on each call  arresting one of  the household’s 
teenagers - her brothers and cousins.  Any sense of domestic safety was shattered as a result. 63
Similarly erosive of social trust, the localised Terror generated or exacerbated pro-
found divisions at the family and household level. Several analysts of the Ethiopian Terror 
have sought to impose a class structure onto the political cleavage between competing politi-
cal organisations;  others have attempted an ethnic analysis of the Terror, linking particular 64
political organisations and ethnic groups together.  The strongest refutation of these projects, 65
born of a desire to conform reality to the mould of theory, lies in the fact that the line separat-
ing conflicting parties often ran not between classes, ethnic groups or even localities, but 
rather through the midst of families and households. Nigist Adane, a leading Meison  and 
POMOA member who made a name for herself as the only one to openly challenge Mengistu 
Haile Mariam,  felt the need to shun her parental home due to her brothers’ activism in the 66
EPRP. The politically active Tito brothers provide a similar example: of the four brothers, 
three - Fikru, Aklilu and Tito - joined the EPRP. Aklilu and Tito acted as successive chairmen 
 Anne Cassiers and Jean-Michel Bessette, Mémoires Éthiopiennes (Paris: L’Harmat63 -
tan, 2001), 481-5.
 For example Lefort, An heretical revolution, 202; compare Bahru Zewde, The histo64 -
ry of the Red Terror, 29.
 For example Christopher Clapham, Transformation and Continuity in Revolutionary 65
Ethiopia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).
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of the party’s Youth League, earning widespread respect and admiration for their dedication 
and mobilising skills. The fourth brother, Yohannes, joined Meison instead after becoming a 
close friend of the organisation’s luminary Haile Fida, with whom he had studied in Paris.  67
Yohannes thus found himself in the opposite camp to his brothers. In dividing siblings in such 
a way, the urban conflict’s master cleavage eschewed categorisation along class, ethnic or 
kinship lines. 
Such experiences were replicated in households across urban Ethiopia, scarred and 
divided by the decentralised and localised dynamics of the Terror. The re-assertion of state 
control over the Terror, with its attendant bureaucratisation and institutionalisation of vio-
lence, was to add a further layer to the disintegration of social ties and of state-society rela-
tions. 
The Bureaucratisation of Collective Violence
In July 1977, the Derg began to reassert its control over the exercise of violence in the 
urban Terror. Its dependance on Meison, which had been the prime driver of local autonomy 
and empowerment, was loosened by the development of Abyotawi Seded  [“Revolutionary 
Fire”], a regime-controlled party intended to take the place of the Derg’s civilian allies. At the 
same time, the impending Somali invasion cast the regime as the defender of national in-
tegrity, corroborating its centralising efforts. The gradual reassertion of government control 
over the urban Terror entailed a bureaucratisation of violence, whereby the exercise of “revo-
lutionary measures” was rationalised, normalised and subjected to greater centralised super-
vision. This process came to define subsequent state-society relations in socialist Ethiopia, 
and cast a long shadow over urban Ethiopia beyond the demise of the Derg. 
Remarkably, the gradual reassertion of government control over the urban Terror has 
received scarce attention in the historiography of the Ethiopian revolution. In his pioneering 
periodisation of the Terror years, Bahru Zewde sees the netsa ermeja, during which “terror 
 Aklilu Kebede, interviewed in Silver Springs, MD, 20 August 2012; Gedion Wolde 67
Amanuel, interviewed at Bole Medhane Alem, Addis Ababa, 19 March 2012.
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had become democratized,”  as the final phase and culmination of the urban violence. He 68
persists, however, in understanding the period exclusively in categories of political violence 
and state terror, and does not address the end of “democratised” violence in the re-assertion 
of regime control over the urban realm. Other scholars similarly disregard this transition, and 
hence ignore the Derg’s bureaucratisation of violence and its profound legacies. 
Integral to the drive to centralise urban Ethiopia’s revolutionary violence was the im-
position and enforcement of structures of supervision and accountability, which meant that 
even as the regime reduced its outward justifications of the Terror, its violence was internally 
being reported and documented in minute detail. The resultant archive of orders, reports and 
authorisations formed the basis of the Special Prosecutor’s “Red Terror Trials” in the 1990s 
and 2000s. Partly and hesitantly entrusted to the independent Ethiopian Red Terror Documen-
tation and Research Center (ERTDRC)  before being retracted from public access by the 69
Ethiopian Ministry of Justice, this archive reflects the tortuous transition from the decen-
tralised autonomy of the netsa ermeja in mid-1977 to the near-complete government control 
of the urban Terror by mid-1978. 
A report to the Derg’s “Public Security Committee”  from July 1977 illustrates the 70
developing transition to greater government control over local violence as well as the process 
whereby the logic of depersonalisation and of revolutionary justice that had driven the earlier 
Terror was institutionalised. The document concerns two low-level EPRP activists, who had 
been apprehended at the Kebele level.  Both youths - Shewatatek Moges Mekuria and Tes71 -
faye Lulu Mengesha - were high school students who had joined the EPRP’s Youth League 
and confessed to involvement in menial operational tasks such as “acquiring red fabric, paper 
and other accessories for propaganda purposes” and “pamphlet distribution”. Both had suf-
 Bahru Zewde, The History of the Red Terror, 28.68
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fered bullet wounds while attempting to evade arrest, Shewatatek suffering a “badly man-
gled” left arm whereas Tesfaye was shot in the thigh. Upon their arrest, the young activists 
had been tortured, but unusually they had also received medical attention. Such care, their 
interrogators felt, was unjustifiable. Instead of “squandering valuable resources on a useless 
counter-revolutionary”, they recommended that “immediate revolutionary action” be taken. A 
hand-written note on the sidebar of the report - “take action” - indicates the fate of these 
young men.
In both cases, authorisation for the execution was given by a branch of the Derg’s 
centralised security apparatus. The report thus provides an early example of the increasingly 
common practice of reporting local dissenters and of violence against them being rationalised 
and centrally authorised, rather than being simply carried out by unaccountable local actors. 
By mid-1978, this process had come to define the concluding urban Terror.
In charge of directing and executing revolutionary violence, which increasingly repre-
sented a unitary terror under state control rather than a multitude of localised terrors, was the 
Derg’s sophisticated security apparatus. Consisting of a network of investigation departments 
linked to prisons and safe houses, it received important support from East German intelli-
gence officers in late 1977.  The structure of this security apparatus has been discussed in 72
some detail in a publication by the Special Prosecutor’s Office   and need not be reproduced 73
here. As the centralisation and bureaucratisation of the urban Terror progressed, its opera-
tional locus increasingly shifted to the prisons that had expanded in size and number during 
the early revolutionary period, and which came to define the experience of the Terror for 
thousands of Ethiopians. Writing in 1978, Katz observed that “there are jails all over Addis. 
[…] There are around 320 prisons [in the capital] alone, with capacities between twenty and 
several thousand. They are all filled.”  Amnesty International similarly contended that by the 74
 Numerous files at the archives of the “Behörde des Bundesbeauftragten für die 72
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end of the Terror, Ethiopia had “turned into one big jail.”  These mass detentions climaxed 75
as the Derg sought to establish control over the urban Terror, and coincide with its efforts to 
gradually remove the violence of the Terror from public view. The shift from overt to covert 
violence was a tortuous one, defined by overlap and reversal as much as by progression and 
change; as it closely mirrors the transition from decentralised to bureaucratised Terror, this 
shift is worth briefly considering in greater detail.
During the netsa ermeja, the public display of dead bodies had become an integral 
feature of Ethiopia’s revolutionary violence. Such open exhibitions of violence continued into 
early 1978, attracting particular attention following the official declaration of “Red Terror” by 
the Derg in November 1977. For the following months, an unprecedented theatre of violence 
dominated urban Ethiopian life. Large posters declaring Key Shibir Yifafam [“Let the Red 
Terror intensify”] were “posted at every likely and unlikely place, in bright and psychedelic 
eye-catching colours”.  Numerous eyewitnesses report that dead bodies were widely dis76 -
played on streets across the city, bearing placards with writings such as “this was a counter-
revolutionary” or “we are tired of burying them”.  This period of the official “Red Terror”, in 77
which the Derg  was  exercising near-hegemonic  control  but  still  being occasionally  chal-
lenged in urban areas, constituted the climax of state violence. The nature of this violence, 
however, was rapidly changing. By early 1978, public assassinations and the open display of 
dead bodies were giving way to nightly abductions and disappearances. The gunfire of execu-
tions could still be heard at night, but these were now being carried out in prison yards and in 
nearby forests rather than on the streets. The violence of the Ethiopian Terror took on a form 
of public secrecy, known and ever-present but removed from the public sphere. As in other 
instances of dirty war and state terror, this public secrecy combined with acts of selective vio-
lence, intruding into private spaces and thereby asserting the absolutist demands of the state 
 Afr.25/04/79, June 1979, Amnesty International.75
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and disrupting “the relations of protection, safety, trust and love”  in society. Such erosion of 78
trust in social ties and in state-society relations came to constitute one of the defining legacies 
of Ethiopia’s Terror years.
The process of bureaucratising violence and of bringing the urban Terror under gov-
ernment control was neither linear nor uncontested. The authority invested in Kebele officers 
and the violence-legitimising discourse of revolution continued to be harnessed by local ac-
tors for private purposes. State control over the urban Terror remained limited until early 
1978, as Kebele officials tested the limits of their autonomy and maintained the initiative in 
the implementation of terror on the ground. Even as the regime was recentralising and bu-
reaucratising the urban violence, local reigns of terror emerged, such as that led in Kebele 09 
by Kelbessa Negewo and Samrat Mamo.  A zealot for the regime’s revolution, Kelbessa and 79
his Abyot Tebeka devoted themselves to “weeding out anti-revolutionary elements” in their 
Kebele  in  the  capital’s  Gulele  neighbourhood,  long a  stronghold  of  the  EPRP.  Too au80 -
tonomous for the resurgent Derg, Kelbessa was eventually purged, spending seven years in 
prison before  finding asylum in the United States  as  a  victim of  political  violence.  That 
Kelbessa, like many other Kebele officials, was eventually held to account for his actions by 
the regime he was serving marks the transition towards totalitarian and monopolised state ter-
ror; it constituted a further step in the bureaucratisation and monopolisation of violence. In 
contrast to Girma Kebede, this was due neither to public pressure nor to falling out of favour 
with Mengistu; Kelbessa was removed from his position because he stood in the way of re-
centralisation. By April 1978, the Derg had founded a committee to investigate cases like 
Kelbessa’s when power had been abused for personal vendetta or local agendas under the 
guise of revolutionary rhetoric.  81
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The transition from the public displays of violence in the official Red Terror to the 
largely covert state terror of 1978 was a gradual and tortuous process, but its advance con-
tributed to the ebbing of the Ethiopian Terror. By March 1978, urban Ethiopia was firmly un-
der regime control. The civilian opposition was in disarray, no longer able to mount a credi-
ble or even concerning challenge to the Derg. The public terror abated. Later in the year, 
open killings had become so rare that Amnesty International described Addis Ababa as one of 
Africa’s safest cities.  While torture and executions continued to be everyday realities in the 82
prisons, the memory and the threat of violence now sufficed as foundations of Derg control 
over urban Ethiopia.
Conclusions
The resolution of the Terror marked the end of urban opposition to the Derg.  The 
regime, which had been fragile and riven by internal divisions when the urban violence be-
gan, emerged from the Terror strengthened and with a firm grip on the state apparatus. But it 
was not only the regime that was transformed by the Terror; the Ethiopian state itself was 
similarly reshaped. The capacity of its revolutionary units of local administration, the Kebe-
les, were vastly expanded in order to respond to the urban challenges of the Terror years. 
Once brought under centralised supervision, these structures gave the Ethiopian state an ex-
ceptional degree of local knowledge and control. The state’s capacity was further bolstered by 
the expansion of its security apparatus, developed with East German help. A new set of vio-
lent practices, including regular search campaigns, were institutionalised within this expand-
ed security apparatus during the Terror. Many of these changes to the state were to outlive the 
Derg regime. 
Ethiopia’s urban society was similarly altered by the Terror. Exile, long despised in 
Ethiopian culture, now became a reality for thousands, generating one of Africa’s largest di-
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asporas.  The political activism that had defined the early revolutionary years disappeared 83
from Ethiopia’s urban centres. Opposition relocated either to the new diasporas, or more effi-
ciently to the rural areas, where it strengthened the ethno-nationalist insurgencies that ulti-
mately overthrew the Derg. Urban citizens widely retreated from the public sphere, privatis-
ing their lives. The erosion of trust entailed by the Terror altered both social ties and state-so-
ciety relations to lasting effect. Ethiopia was a profoundly different place in the wake of its 
revolutionary violence.
It is thus evident that the Ethiopian Terror marked a major turning point in the modern 
history of Ethiopia, altering the state, society, and relations between them. This important 
role, however, is not reflected in the Terror’s historiography, which persists in treating urban 
Ethiopia’s collective violence as a mere appendix to revolution. Through the modes of its vio-
lence, which penetrated every sphere of urban life and bequeathed the country with a more 
violent, more capable and more intrusive state, the Terror transformed urban Ethiopia. Its ef-
fects continue to reverberate to this day.
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